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VOLUME 95 NUMBER 5 2018   
 
THREE FORMS OF LEGAL PRAGMATISM 
CHARLES L. BARZUN 
Within any discipline there are said to be lumpers and splitters, 
hedgehogs and foxes.1 My inclinations run to lumping, but in this essay I 
aim to do some splitting. Specifically, I seek to distinguish among three 
distinct forms of legal pragmatism. Although my sympathy for one of the 
strands will likely become clear, my purpose is mainly to identify and 
distinguish them, not to assess their relative virtues and vices.  
In embarking on such an effort, I join company not only with Professor 
Tamanaha, but also with another of my co-participants, Gerald Postema. 
Both Professor Tamanaha and Professor Postema have articulated 
approaches to, or theories of, Anglo-American law that they characterize as 
a “third way” or as an effort to reconcile competing traditions of legal 
thought.2 In his latest book, Professor Tamanaha endorses what he calls 
“social legal theory” as a rival to the analytic and natural law traditions.3 
Similarly, Professor Postema has defended common law theory as an 
alternative to natural law and legal positivism.4 Though not identical, both 
																																								 																				
1.  ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX (1951). 
2.  Professor Haack defends a third way in epistemology, offering “foundherentism” as an 
alternative to foundationalism and coherentism. I suspect that there are interesting affinities between her 
account and some of the jurisprudential third ways, but I leave that question aside. SUSAN HAACK, 
EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: A PRAGMATIST RECONSTRUCTION OF EPISTEMOLOGY (2009).  
3.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 27–30 (2017).  
4.  Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 599 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 











of these “third ways” look for intellectual inspiration to the common law 
tradition, to philosophical pragmatism, or to both.5 
It would be possible to view my own account as a rival to those just 
mentioned because it shares their pragmatist and common law affinities but 
offers another interpretation of what fidelity to those traditions requires. 
Professor Tamanaha, for instance, characterizes social legal theory as 
“empirically oriented” (rather than “normative” or “analytic”) and cites 
William James for support for his view.6 In my view, though, James 
understood pragmatism as a means of reconciling empiricist, normative, and 
conceptual demands. 
But it is equally plausible, and probably more useful, to see the following 
account as an effort to draw further distinctions within these other “third 
ways.” That is, I aim to distinguish among three different ways in which one 
might seek—and judges and legal scholars in fact have sought—a 
reconciliation of, or alternative to, some of the traditional dichotomies in 
legal thought. That does not mean that my interpretation is perfectly 
consistent with the others I have mentioned. It is not. For instance, it 
produces different judgments about how to classify particular legal 
theorists, such as Lon Fuller, Hart and Sacks, and Ronald Dworkin.7 And 
indeed, part of my purpose is to show that some legal thinkers not typically 
thought of as part of the pragmatist tradition in fact belong to it. Still, I seek 
to further refine some of the themes in common with these other accounts 
rather than offer an innovative account of their meaning or importance. I am 
following in their paths, substantively and methodologically.  
 Take, for instance, Professor Postema’s work on the philosophy of the 
common law. Postema explains how common law theory differs from 
traditional positivism this way: “Common law conventionalism shifts 
theoretical attention from laws—the authoritative directives produced by 
lawmaking institutions—to the process of practical reasoning with and 
within law. Law, on this view, is a matter of convention, but it is a 
convention of a special sort, namely a practised discipline of practical 
reasoning.”8 That is just the shift I welcome. I am less interested in the 
																																								 																				
5.  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative 
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. OF JURIS. 315, 317 (1996) 
(arguing that philosophical pragmatism provides a foundation for “sociolegal studies”).  
6.  TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 2–3 (citing James), 30 (empirical); see also Tamanaha, supra 
note 5, at 318–19 (arguing that philosophical pragmatism provides a basis for drawing the fact-value 
distinction).  
7.  See TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 29 (assigning Fuller and Dworkin to the natural law 
tradition).  
8.  Postema, supra note 4, at 601. I understand Postema’s alternative conception of the task of 
jurisprudence to be consistent with the understandings of law Tamanaha and Posner offer. See 
TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 73 (defining law as “whatever people identify and treat through their social 












question “what is law?” than in the question, “how do, and should, judges 
practically reason with and about legal materials?” 
Those are not the only philosophical questions one might ask about law 
and legal practice. They may not even be the most important ones. But they 
are the ones I take up here, albeit at a very high level of generality. My 
central thesis is that there are three distinct ways of answering these 
questions and that each of them has its intellectual roots in an early 
twentieth-century understanding of the common law method that was 
informed by philosophical pragmatism. In other words, there are three 
distinct forms that third-way legal pragmatism can take. I dub them 
instrumentalist, quietist, and holist versions of pragmatism.  
The purpose of this essay is to explain what I mean by each of these 
labels and assign them to a few well-known figures in the Anglo-American 
legal tradition. The portrait drawn will necessarily be sketchy and its 
argument skeletal. But I hope to show how each type offers its own distinct 
solution to the same fundamental problem—one initially raised and 
confronted by early twentieth-century pragmatist philosophers, judges, and 
legal scholars and then again, in a slightly modified form, at mid-century. 
In this way, my approach may be seen as a version of the genealogical 
approach to studying law Professor Tamanaha endorses and practices in his 
recent book.9  
Why bother with such an endeavor? Here is one answer. At the end of 
the last century, the modern philosopher perhaps most associated with 
philosophical pragmatism, Richard Rorty, suggested that legal pragmatism 
had become “banal” because virtually all legal theorists were some sort of 
pragmatist.10 He recognized differences between, say, the views of Judge 
Posner and those of Ronald Dworkin. But he considered the differences to 
be mainly political. According to Rorty, there were no interesting 
philosophical differences between them.11  
This essay is a response to Rorty on that question. In my view, Rorty is 
right to apply the label “pragmatist” widely to diverse legal scholars, but he 
is too quick to lump them all together. There remain interesting 
philosophical differences among those legal theorists who fit under the 
																																								 																				
(defending an “activity theory of law,” which treats law as “something that licensed persons, mainly 
judges, lawyers, and legislators, do, rather than a box they pull off the shelf when a legal question 
appears, in the hope of finding the answer in it.”).  
9.  TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 82 (employing and endorsing an approach that “trace[s] law 
backward—thence forward—looking for earlier manifestations, continuities, variations, and growths”).  
10.  Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1811 (1990).  
11.  Id. at 1813 (“I find it hard to discern any interesting philosophical differences between 
Unger, Dworkin, and Posner; their differences strike me as entirely political, as differences about how 
much change and what sort of change American institutions need.”).  











umbrella of pragmatist legal thought, even if—especially if—that umbrella 
is a large one, as I will argue. They are differences about the nature of 
practical reasoning—in particular, about how judges reason about facts and 
values.  
I. PRAGMATISM, SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE, AND REALISM 
Before we can distinguish among the three branches of pragmatist legal 
theory, we must locate their common origin. Two of the best known early 
twentieth-century jurists, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo, both 
described the view of law they endorsed as “pragmatist,” and, in the same 
works, each cited William James’s Pragmatism.12 There James offered a 
resolution to a dilemma analogous to one Pound and Cardozo sought to 
resolve in the context of adjudication. The ambiguities latent in both the 
philosophical and jurisprudential versions of these solutions help explain 
the first major divide within legal pragmatism—one we will see accentuated 
by two well-known legal realists.  
A. William James’s Pragmatism 
James frames his Pragmatism lectures as an effort of reconciliation. 
Specifically, he aims to reconcile two broad philosophical traditions, 
empiricism and rationalism. James famously characterizes these two 
competing traditions in psychological terms, as representing two sorts of 
intellectual temperaments. Empiricism is the philosophy of the “tough-
minded,” who are skeptical and materialistic and focus on facts. “Tender-
minded” philosophers, on the other hand, are optimistic and intellectualistic 
and are devoted to the discovery of principles.13 James’s point is that most 
people “have a hankering for the good things on both sides of the line”—
they care about facts and principles.14 The modern person lives in the age 
of science and admires its achievements. But the view of the world—and of 
man’s place within it—is “materialistic and depressing.”15 Many of us do 
not want to abandon “the old confidence in human values and the resultant 
spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type.”16 So the 
question is, how can we hang on to both? 
																																								 																				
12.  Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608–09 (1908); 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12, 102 (1921).  
13.  WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 12 
(1907).  
14.  Id. at 13.  
15.  Id. at 16. 












James offers pragmatism as a method for providing answers to that 
question.17 It is capable of identifying genuine metaphysical disputes and 
then resolving them in a manner congenial to both philosophical traditions. 
Or, more precisely, it offers a way of justifying traditional rationalist 
doctrines on empiricist grounds. The pragmatist asks, of any given 
metaphysical controversy, “What difference would it practically make to 
any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?”18 If it makes no 
difference in the world, then the dispute is senseless; but if it does make a 
difference, then there is a genuine question as to its existence. Citing the 
work of Charles Peirce, James insists that in order to get clear about some 
concept, we must ask “what sensations we are to expect from it, and what 
reactions we must prepare.”19 As any good empiricist would demand, 
experience provides the ultimate test.  
James then takes the further step of suggesting that pragmatism offers a 
way of determining whether a belief in some idea, concept, or doctrine is 
true. The test again is one of concrete experience. The pragmatist asks 
whether a given doctrine or idea is “good in the way of belief,”20 where 
“good” means that believing in it enables us to experience life in a better 
way. So, for instance, if believing in God “prove[s] to have a value for 
concrete life,” then such a belief qualifies as true.21 In this way, the approach 
represents the “empiricist attitude,” but it does so, according to James in “a 
more radical and in a less objectionable form,” because it harbors no 
“materialistic bias.”22 Thus does pragmatism reconcile the two competing 
traditions in philosophy: “Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. 
Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take 
anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and 
most personal experiences.”23  
James acknowledges the obvious objection to this view. If the test is 
merely whether a belief is “good” for us, then pragmatism seems to 
authorize belief in all sorts of “sentimental superstitions.”24 The response to 
this worry is that the test of experience applies to all our beliefs as well, so 
if adopting a new belief would clash with our other, previously held 
beliefs—which are themselves “vital” for living—then it may be properly 
																																								 																				
17.  Id. at 33. 
18.  Id. at 45. 
19.  Id. at 46–47 (citing C.S. Peirce, How to Make our Ideas Clear, 12 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 
286–302 (1878)).  
20.  JAMES, supra note 13, at 76.  
21.  Id. at 73.  
22.  Id. at 51, 72. 
23.  Id. at 80. 
24.  Id. at 77. 











rejected for that reason.25 Such rejection frequently happens, James 
explains, because we tend to be “extreme conservatives” about our beliefs, 
saving as many of the ones we already hold as possible.26 That does not 
mean they can never be revised, but it does mean that they are revised 
infrequently and slowly. The result is that we tend only to take on new ideas 
when doing so enables us to “preserve[] the older stock of truths with a 
minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit 
the novelty.”27 
Now there are lots of potential objections to this method of validating 
beliefs, but instead of raising those objections, I want to distinguish between 
a narrow and a wide way of interpreting the pragmatist test of “experience.” 
The narrow view limits the sort of experience that can validate beliefs to 
sensory experience—to what we can see, smell, hear, feel, or touch. The 
wide view includes sensory experience and the “emotional” reactions that 
we often experience simultaneously with our sensory perception of some 
phenomena and that incline us to judge it as attractive or repulsive, good or 
bad, right or wrong, transcendent or commonplace. I am tempted to use the 
phrase “lived experience” to convey this wider sense of experience, though 
that term sometimes takes on a more specific connotation not intended 
here.28 
Both views flow from understandable pragmatist motivations. On the 
one hand, pragmatism’s emphasis on what works in practice seems 
plausible in part because it fits so nicely with a naturalist, Darwinian picture 
of the world and of man’s place within it—a picture that was (presumably) 
arrived at by distinguishing carefully between sensory experience and the 
“emotional” reactions that accompany it, as traditional empiricism 
demands. On the other hand, if all our beliefs are in theory revisable, and 
we genuinely cannot make sense of an “objective” account of the world to 
which our knowledge “corresponds,”29 then why not revise the Darwinian 
picture itself in light of our lived experience?  
																																								 																				
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. at 60.  
27.  Id. 
28.  In particular, it is sometimes used to describe the lived experience of oppressed or 
marginalized groups. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a 
Narratology, 18 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2006) (“It has become something of a commonplace—too 
much of one—that legal storytelling has the virtue of presenting the lived experience of marginalized 
groups or individuals in a way that traditional legal reasoning doesn’t.”). Although, as I say, that 
connotation is not intended here, the fact that people’s lived experience can vary widely depending on 
their race, sex, class, or sexual orientation no doubt bears on our assessment of its proper role in judicial 
decision-making.  
29.  JAMES, supra note 13, at 64 (“Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the 
function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played 












Which of these two routes the pragmatist chooses to follow will make a 
big difference as to the sort of inquiry the pragmatic method entails. So it is 
a fair and important question to ask of any purported pragmatist. James 
himself seems clearly to have taken the wide view of experience.30 But I am 
less interested in defending that claim than in showing how an analogous 
interpretive question arises for the legal pragmatist. 
B. Roscoe Pound’s critique of “Mechanical Jurisprudence” 
Pound is famous for criticizing what he called “mechanical 
jurisprudence.” He used that term to describe a formal style of reasoning in 
which courts decide cases by resorting to broad principles like “liberty of 
contract.”31 Just as James criticized the rationalists’ use of “solving names,” 
like God, Matter, and Reason, to resolve metaphysical disputes, Pound 
(citing James), criticized courts for invoking solving words like estoppel, 
privity, or malice to decide concrete cases.32 The problem with that 
approach was that such concepts often failed to describe accurately the 
actual facts courts confronted. The liberty-of-contract doctrine, for instance, 
treated parties as if they were two individuals freely engaging in an 
exchange, whereas in fact at least one party (and sometimes both) were not 
individuals at all, but large organizations, such as corporations or unions.33 
But, like James, Pound did not seek to eliminate such solving words; 
instead, he sought to provide them with a new foundation. The aspiration to 
make law a “science” remained, in Pound’s view, a worthy one, so long as 
the notion of science was properly understood. The test of adequacy for any 
doctrine must be the effects it produces in the real world: “Being scientific 
as a means toward an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves, not 
by the niceties of its internal structure.”34 The test, in other words, is the 
pragmatic test of experience. 
Also like James, Pound recognized that this willingness to revise 
doctrines in light of their “results” seemed vulnerable to the objection that 
it was too permissive. He thus criticized those judges who “fix their gaze 
upon the raw equities of a cause and forage in the books for cases to sustain 
the desired result.”35 Instead, legal science, properly understood, required 
																																								 																				
30.  Id. at 80 (explaining that pragmatism “will count mystical experiences if they have practical 
consequences”). See also CHERYL MISAK, THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS 70 (2013) (“James’s 
empiricism is in step with very early American philosophy and with his pragmatist contemporaries in 
trying to make the concept of experience go beyond the physical senses.”).  
31.  Pound, supra note 12, at 615–16.  
32.  Id. at 621.  
33.  Id. at 616. 
34.  Id. at 605.  
35.  Id. at 622.  











that the judge attempt to render decisions consistent with the legal analogue 
to James’s “stock of truths,” namely the body of principles contained in the 
legal corpus. Judges, in Pound’s view, should attempt to give “a fresh 
illustration of the intelligent application of the principle to a concrete cause, 
producing a workable and a just result.”36 
C. Benjamin Cardozo’s Method of Sociology 
As the title of his lectures indicate, in The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
Cardozo sought to give an account of the “judicial process.” More 
specifically, he devotes the bulk of his lectures to explaining the various 
methods by which judges, having identified the rule or principle potentially 
applicable to the case at hand, then sought to “fix the bounds and the 
tendencies of development and growth” of that principle.37 Although he 
announces four such methods, it soon becomes clear that his main concern 
is reconciling the demands of two of these: the “method of philosophy” and 
the “method of sociology.”38 It is in elaborating that second method that we 
see Cardozo come up against the same interpretive issue just identified in 
James’s Pragmatism.  
The “method of philosophy” refers to both the process of deductive 
reasoning from general rules to particular cases and that of reasoning by 
analogy from one case to another. Cardozo emphasized that this method is 
not necessarily the most important one, but it does enjoy “a certain 
presumption in its favor” because a principle capable of rationalizing many 
cases has a “tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend itself to 
new cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize.”39 For 
that reason, when Cardozo insisted that most cases that come before him as 
a judge have one clear right answer, the method employed is implicitly the 
method of philosophy.40 
The problem for judges is that sometimes multiple principles bear on the 
same case, making reliance upon the method of philosophy insufficient to 
determine the outcome. When that occurs, the judge’s most useful tool is 
the “method of sociology,” which is the “greatest [method] of them all.” 
This method takes as its guiding assumption that “the final cause of law is 
																																								 																				
36.  Id. 
37.  CARDOZO, supra note 12, at 30. 
38.  Id. at 30–31. Cardozo devotes only six pages to the method of history, six more to the method 
of tradition, and then acknowledges that the method of tradition and that of sociology “have their roots 
in the same soil.” Id. at 51–64. The primacy of the methods of philosophy and sociology is also implied 
by the facts that he treats the method of sociology as the “arbiter” of the other methods and that (as 
mentioned in the main text) he considers most cases to be easily decided (by the method of philosophy). 
Id. at 66, 164.  
39.  Id. at 31.  












the welfare of society.”41 That means that it requires judges to weigh the 
various “social interests” implicated in a given case.42 One of the most 
important social interests is the interest in having a law that is “uniform and 
impartial,” but so, too, is “the social interest served by equity and fairness 
or other elements of social welfare.”43 That is why the method of sociology 
ends up being “the arbiter between other methods, determining in the last 
analysis the choice of each, weighing their competing claims, setting bounds 
to their pretensions, balancing and moderating and harmonizing them all.”44 
For Cardozo, the dominance of the sociological method showed that “the 
juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of 
pragmatism.”45 The reason is that the sociological method depends on the 
twin assumptions that (1) the purpose of law is to improve social welfare 
and (2) such a goal provides the proper standard by which to understand its 
terms and guide its growth. It thus treats concepts and abstractions 
instrumentally, in the same way we have seen both Pound and James 
advocate. Like them, Cardozo sees the common law as guided ultimately by 
experience on the model of the natural sciences. “Its method is inductive,” 
Cardozo explains, “and it draws its generalizations from particulars.”46 
That is all well and good, but when it comes to describing what that 
“inductive” process of reasoning actually looks like, Cardozo has difficulty 
pinning it down with precision. A few representative passages suffice to 
illustrate the point:  
 
•  “[T]he thing that counts is not what I believe to be right. It 
is what I may reasonably believe that some other man of normal 
intellect and conscience might reasonably look upon as right.”47 
 
• “My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and 
little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the 
accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or 
in combination shape the progress of the law.”48 
 
•  “[The judge] must balance all his ingredients, his 
philosophy, his logic, his analogies, his history, his customs, his 
sense of right, and all the rest, and adding a little here and taking 
																																								 																				
41.  Id. at 65–66.  
42.  Id. at 112. 
43.  Id. at 112–13. 
44.  Id. at 98.  
45.  Id. at 102 (citing Pound, supra note 12, at 609).  
46.  Id. at 23.  
47.  Id. at 89. 
48.  Id. at 112. 











out a little there, must determine, as wisely as he can, which weight 
shall tip the scales. If this seems a weak and inconclusive summary, 
I am not sure that the fault is mine.”49 
 
The ambiguities in Cardozo’s various formulations of the “judicial 
process”—how one might “balance” utility against social mores or one’s 
“sense of right” as against “history”—reveal the fundamental difficulty at 
the heart of sociological jurisprudence of the sort both he and Pound 
endorsed: How, exactly, is a judge to “weigh” social “interests”?50 What is 
the nature of such a task? Is it an empirical inquiry that requires gathering 
facts about social conditions? An ethical one that requires an analysis of, or 
introspective inquiry into, the significance of competing values? Despite the 
title of Cardozo’s lectures, he never quite gives a satisfying answer to such 
questions. “If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest 
outweighs another,” Cardozo admits, “I can only answer that he must get 
his knowledge as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and 
reflection; in brief, from life itself.”51 
It is tempting to chart a middle course by saying that the pragmatist 
should look to society’s norms or value judgments, not the judge’s own, to 
determine the weight of the interests at stake. The common law method has 
long been interpreted as requiring such an inquiry into societal mores.52 At 
times, Cardozo suggests it is the right one to take—one of the four judicial 
methods is, after all, the “method of tradition” or custom. “It is the 
customary morality of right-minded men and women,” he explains, “which 
[the judge] is to enforce by his decree.”53 But as his use of the modifier 
“right-minded” reveals, this move just pushes the issue back: one must still 
ask whether the task is an essentially empirical one, or whether, instead, the 
judge must rely on her own intuition to discover what “right-minded men 
and women” think. 
The point here is not to criticize Cardozo for being confused or 
contradictory, it is merely to show that his ambiguities revolve around the 
jurisprudential analogue to the question, mentioned above, of how to 
interpret pragmatism’s test of “experience.” In the philosophical context, 
we distinguished between a pragmatist who treats only sensory experience 
																																								 																				
49.  Id. at 162. 
50.  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 344 (1915) 
(“Strictly the concern of the law is with social interests, since it is the social interest in securing the 
individual interest that must determine the law to secure it.”).   
51.  CARDOZO, supra note 12, at 113. 
52.  See, e.g., Postema, supra note 4, at 602 (explaining that a view Postema dubs “common law 
conventionalism” holds that law “depends for its existence on substantial congruence and continuity 
with broader practices in the community”). 












as the sort of experience that may validate one’s belief in a moral or 
metaphysical doctrine (“narrow view”) and one who also allows her 
emotional or “lived” experience to inform her pragmatic judgments (“wide 
view”). In the adjudicatory context, we can similarly distinguish between a 
pragmatist judge who, when the law is unclear, concerns herself exclusively 
with gathering as many facts as possible about the social and economic 
conditions potentially relevant to a case and one who allows her intuitions 
about the “just” outcome or the proper “balance” of values to govern. Both 
judges are pragmatist in the sense that they do not consider themselves 
strictly bound by their stock of legal truths (i.e., the doctrines and principles 
of the legal corpus) and so feel free to adjust them in light of new 
experience. But, as the analogy to the philosopher-pragmatist reveals, they 
proceed on very different assumptions about the nature of the practical and 
theoretical inquiry the judge faces. That difference can be seen even more 
starkly by comparing two works of legal theory published shortly after 
Cardozo’s lectures.  
D. Walter Wheeler Cook’s Scientific Method 
As the title of his short essay, The Scientific Method and the Law, 
suggests, Walter Wheeler Cook sought to improve law by making its 
method more scientific.54 For Cook, that meant recognizing that the 
concepts of any science were merely tools for manipulating the environment 
and achieving certain goals.55 James and others had shown, Cook argued, 
that any effort to classify phenomena can only be justified by reference to 
some purpose for which the classification is intended. Thus, the scientist’s 
real task is “to determine whether the differences involved which make us 
think of it as new, are as a practical matter, i.e., as tested by their 
consequences, important for the purpose we have in view.”56 
He then went on to explain what this meant for the judge. Only a few 
judges, such as Holmes and Cardozo, recognized that judges really impose 
meaning on legal terms, rather than extract it from them. In order to figure 
how best to “legislate” in this way, Cook insisted that the judge must look 
to “considerations of social or economic policy.” Thus, he must know two 
things: “(1) what social consequences or results are to be aimed at; and (2) 
how a decision one way or other will affect the attainment of those 
results.”57 The legal scholar, who aims to gauge the effectiveness of law, 
must engage in a similar kind of reasoning: “we must know what at any 
																																								 																				
54.  Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927). 
55.  Id. at 305. 
56.  Id. at 306. 
57.  Id. at 308. 











given period these ends are and also whether the means selected, the given 
rules of law, are indeed adapted to securing them.”58 
E. Jerome’s Frank’s “Scientific Spirit” 
A few years later, Jerome Frank published Law and the Modern Mind, 
in which he took a very different view of the nature of the problem and its 
solution.59 Frank agreed with Cook that lawyers and judges were too 
dogmatic in their attachment to formal rules, doctrines and practices.60 But 
he disagreed with Cook that the solution required a more rigorous 
assessment of how best to achieve particular goals.61 Instead, Frank drew a 
different lesson from James. The important thing was to give up on the goal 
of certainty itself, even if that certainty is about how best to achieve a 
particular outcome.62 Life is chaotic and our knowledge of the world 
uncertain. Once one comes to grip with those facts, one should abandon, or 
at least reduce the significance of, the goal of establishing classifications in 
the first place. Being “scientific,” for Frank, meant adopting a particular 
stance or attitude—one he called the “scientific spirit”—not applying a 
particular analytic method.63 The stance is that of the “creative scientist,” 
who devotes himself “to new ways of manipulating protean particulars and 
not to the quest of undeviating universals.”64 The process required to attain 
that attitude was largely an emotional, rather than an intellectual, one. It 
required, above all, that judges and lawyers free themselves of the 
“emotional blocking” that results from their need for security and fatherly 
authority. Once they have done so, they will stop projecting certainty onto 
the law and be more comfortable in using its rules, doctrines, and concepts 
to achieve justice.65 
Frank thus envisions a quite different role for the judge than does Cook. 
According to Frank, we need judges “with a touch in them of the qualities 
which make poets,” who will “administer justice as an art,” so we should 
“encourage, not . . . discountenance, imagination, intuition, [and] insight.”66 
Because what judges and lawyers think the law ought to be “constitutes, 
rightfully, no small part of the thinking of lawyers and judges. Such thinking 
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should not be diminished, but augmented.”67 If we are able to cultivate such 
sensibilities in judges, we might then encourage a “more constructive type 
of speculating” in which judges imagine “possibly useful rearrangements of 
experience.”68 
 
* * * 
 
One can see, then, that Cook and Frank interpret the pragmatist test for 
judges differently and that they do so in ways that map onto the ambiguity 
identified in Cardozo’s lectures. Cook interprets it as requiring judges to test 
the value of legal doctrines by reference to the observable social and 
economic consequences they produce. Therefore, the key is for judges to be 
clear in their thinking about goals and rigorous in trying to predict the 
consequences of their decisions.69 Frank, meanwhile, has a more expansive 
understanding of the kind of “experience” that validates a decision. It 
includes the judge’s own emotional reactions and felt experience. So the 
goal is to cultivate judicial sensibilities in such a way as to produce the right 
sort of reactions to the particular facts in a case—reactions that would 
produce legal certainty in a “deeper sense.”70  
We can also see how each approach carries its own difficulties or 
challenges. Cook’s vision of the judge who limits herself to gathering 
(observable) facts about the world must bring to bear some criterion, or 
establish some goal, by which to measure success. Does it require a 
utilitarian balancing, as Cardozo’s phrase “social welfare” would connote 
today? If so, what values should be maximized? And how do we measure 
them? Finally, where does the criterion come from? If it comes from the 
legal corpus itself, then the judge’s pragmatism is doing no work—she is 
simply applying settled law deductively. But if it does not come from there, 
where does it come from? New sensory experiences alone seem incapable 
of themselves providing such a standard.  
Frank’s more inclusive or “wide” approach, however, carries its own 
problems. It has a better answer to the question of where its evaluative 
judgments come from. They come from the judge’s own (emotional) 
reactions to the world – that is, from experience (broadly conceived), as they 
should for a pragmatist. But then the question is why the judge should trust 
such reactions. Indeed, Frank famously gives plenty of reasons for thinking 
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that, in general, the intuitions of judges should not be trusted—they are all 
too often in the grip of a childish need for fatherly authority.71 
The source of the difficulties just described is the same problem to which 
James offered pragmatism as a solution: how to make sense of “human 
values” in a world that science tells us includes only matter in motion.72  Put 
more crudely, the problem is how to reconcile fact and value. The failures 
of Cook and Frank show how, in trying to solve that problem, the pragmatist 
can easily get caught on the horns of a dilemma: Her empiricism directs her 
attention outward and demands that she observe the actual consequences of 
some concept, rule, or system of belief. But she cannot literally see injustice 
or injustice, good or evil. Rather, the source of value seems to somehow 
come from within. And yet the scientific understanding of the world gives 
us no reason to trust the introspections on which we rely to discern such 
values.  
II. HART AND SACKS (AND FULLER): TOWARD A NEW RECONCILIATION? 
The famous teaching materials, The Legal Process, by Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks, constitute perhaps the most ambitious effort, at the time of 
their writing, by legal scholars to resolve the dilemma just described.73 Hart 
and Sacks’s solution had two key elements. First, they ascribed to law and 
legal institutions an overriding social purpose, thereby providing a criterion 
both for those tasked with making decisions within legal institutions (i.e., 
lawyers and judges) and for those who analyze and evaluate those 
institutions (i.e., legal scholars).74 Second, as a methodological matter, they 
insisted that judgments of fact and value—or, as they put it “means” and 
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accurately, an approach to a set of attempted solutions) that grew out of the pragmatist tradition, spanned 
most of the twentieth century, and was particularly influential among legal scholars.  
73.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
74.  For a more extended argument that is similar, though not identical, to the one developed in 












ends”—are interdependent on one another. This latter, methodological 
conviction is what reveals the pragmatist roots of their solution.  
A. The (Social) Purpose of (Legal) Institutions 
Hart and Sacks begin by explaining that one of the “basic conditions of 
human existence” is that human beings have desires or “wants.” These 
wants vary, from the basic needs of survival, to the desire to “achieve some 
sense of oneness with the universe.”75 Because at least some of these wants 
are revisable in light of “external suggestion” and “internal reflection,” a 
human life itself is “an unceasing process of fixing upon those [wants] on 
which time and effort are to be expended, and trying to satisfy them.”76 But 
because satisfying wants often requires the work or support of others, 
human beings choose to live in groups.  Once they do so, they inevitably 
form interests in common. At the very least, people living in groups share 
an interest in maintaining the conditions that make group life possible. 
Those conditions include having an agreed-upon set of procedures for 
settling disagreements about the “understandings” on which social life will 
be conducted, procedures for deciding what happens when people violate 
one of those understandings, and, finally, a procedure for changing the 
understandings.77  
Given the need for such procedures, Hart and Sacks conclude that the 
“constitutive or procedural understandings . . . are obviously more 
fundamental than the substantive arrangements in the structure of a society, 
if not in the realization of its ultimate aims.”78 They are more fundamental, 
again, because they serve an interest in which all share, namely maintaining 
group life. That is why, for Hart and Sacks, the “central idea of law” is what 
they call the “principle of institutional settlement,” which expresses the 
judgment that “decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the 
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.”79 
One of the corollaries of the principle of institutional settlement is that 
the rules determining the scope and limits of the various institutions tasked 
with “duly” making such decisions—courts, legislatures, private ordering, 
and administrative agencies—come to be seen as “the most significant and 
enduring part of the whole legal system, because they are the matrix of 
everything else.”80 This is one (but only one) reason why the course for 
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which the materials were written was called the The Legal Process. On the 
view it offers, law is primarily concerned with determining how decisions 
get made and who is properly tasked with making them. 
One way, then, that Hart and Sacks resolve the dilemma we saw in 
Cardozo’s lectures is by scaling back the ambitions of courts. They are no 
longer tasked with balancing “social interests” directly so much as they are 
tasked with policing the process by which those interests are given 
protection by other institutions, whether private parties, legislatures, or 
administrative agencies. According to Hart and Sacks, adjudication is only 
appropriate where it can be conducted “rationally,” by which they meant 
pursuant to some commonly agreed-upon standard.81 That standard may be 
found in the purpose of a legislature’s statutory enactments or, when those 
run out, in the fundamental purposes of the law and society. But because the 
purposes most likely to enjoy sufficient consensus to qualify as “social 
purposes” are process-based ones about how to settle substantive 
disagreements, the purposes that guide adjudication are likely to be 
procedural in nature as well. 
This turn to “process” over “substance” is one reason why Hart and 
Sacks came under attack by a younger generation of legal scholars. 
According to these scholars, Hart and Sacks responded to skeptical attacks 
on the rationality of adjudication only by accepting a value relativism for 
questions of “substance” (relegated to the legislature) while insisting that 
courts could “neutrally” decide questions of “procedure.”82 But, according 
to this criticism, Hart and Sacks were mistaken because deciding questions 
of procedure necessarily requires making judgments about whose interests 
get counted and how. Questions of procedure are just as inescapably 
political as those of “substance.”83 
B. The (Pragmatic) Method of Institutional Analysis  
That characterization is accurate insofar as Hart and Sacks thought courts 
were on firmer ground when deciding procedural questions. But it is wrong 
to suggest that Hart and Sacks claimed that one could make such judgments 
without reference to values. To the contrary, they repeatedly emphasized 
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that even to describe an institution required making reference to the purpose 
for which it exists. And since such descriptions or analyses might be used 
to make decisions about or within these institutions, it followed that offering 
such accounts required making judgments of value.84  
This is the second way in which Hart and Sacks sought to reconcile the 
ambiguity identified in Cardozo—and the way in which they reveal 
themselves to be legal pragmatists as well. In their view, what they called 
the “science of society” required both empirical study and introspection—
or, as they put it “experience and reflection.”85 A judge does not simply 
stipulate what the purpose of some statute or body of case law is and then 
figure out what decision or doctrine would best achieve it. Instead, she looks 
to the law itself and tries to infer what its underlying purpose is.86 So, too, 
then, when a judge or legal scholar must discern the underlying purposes of 
some legal institution, she does not simply stipulate a social goal and then 
figure out the most efficient means to achieve it. Instead, she looks to the 
conditions under which the institution seems to function well and to be 
generally accepted as legitimate. As Hart and Sacks put it, such experience 
and reflection on actual practices “tells the social scientist . . . a good deal 
about the ultimate aims of the institutional system with which he is 
concerned.”87 
Hart and Sacks, following their colleague, Lon Fuller, described this 
method of analysis as the “interaction between social ends and social 
means.”88  It was a pervasive theme of their materials and in Fuller’s work.89 
Both were likely influenced by John Dewey, who explored the 
philosophical issues implicit in such a form of practical reasoning more 
extensively.90 The approach may properly be classed as pragmatic in the 
Jamesian sense because it tests the adequacy of abstractions—whether 
concepts, rules, principles, or whole legal institutions—by reference to how 
well they work in practice.91 But—and this is the important point—it 
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depends on what I have called the “wide” interpretation of experience. After 
all, the judge facing a decision cannot see the purposes of the institution 
whose jurisdiction she is tasked with expanding or delimiting. So empirical 
information alone does not suffice, even for “procedural” matters. Law is 
“judgmatical” or “prudential” social science precisely because it requires 
the lawyer, judge, or legal scholar to attend to her own intuitions as to what 
is “sound” or “workable”—intuitions that the law school course for which 
the materials were written was intended to inculcate.92  
III. THE CRITIQUE OF LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AND THREE RESPONSES 
TO IT 
This tendency of process theory to treat fact and value as interdependent 
may be what led to the attacks on it. Even if values could not be read directly 
off practices, it seemed to offer few moral resources for condemning en 
masse whole categories of social and legal institutions. So at a time when 
stark moral conflicts began to emerge in American society, around both the 
civil rights movement and then the Vietnam War, the legal process approach 
came to seem complacent and conservative.93  
Process theory also came under attack from two different quarters for 
having too rosy a view of how legal institutions work. First, economists and 
political scientists challenged the assumption that legislatures and courts 
actually pursued social purposes of the sort Hart and Sacks ascribed to them. 
Building off the insights of Kenneth Arrow’s work, public choice theorists 
sought to expose and explain the difficulty—indeed, under certain 
conditions, the impossibility—of using voting procedures to generate 
collective decisions.94 Moreover, according to the models employed by such 
theorists, institutional actors pursued their own self-interest, which in the 
context of legislators typically meant reelection.95 Thus, the idea that one 
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could discern coherent and public-regarding purposes in the actions of 
legislatures, or even courts,96 seemed naïve.  
At the same time, critical legal scholars offered historical critiques, 
which showed how legal regimes and institutions had served to maintain the 
power of particular classes. Morton Horwitz, for instance, argued that 
appellate judges in the nineteenth century had manipulated various private 
law doctrines in order to prevent the railroads and other businesses from 
having to bear the costs that rapid industrialization imposed on society. 97 
Professor Gordon generalized the point, arguing that what he called 
“historicist” arguments posed a significant threat to traditional forms of 
legal scholarship, not only because they gave the lie to the idea that law 
responded adequately to “social needs,” but because there were no, naturally 
occurring “social needs” in the first place; instead, there were only 
conflicting interests—interests that were themselves the product of law.98  
Although launched with different ideological motivations and from 
different methodological perspectives, both of these critiques effectively 
aimed to undermine the assumptions of process theory by explaining what 
was really going on in American legal practice. I will therefore refer to them 
together as the explanatory critique.  
In what follows, I aim to identify three sorts of responses to the 
explanatory critique. My claim is not that each was consciously conceived 
of, or formulated as, such a response (though at least one was). Instead, my 
purpose is to show how each offers a model of judicial reasoning (and 
practical reasoning generally) that in some way takes account of the sort of 
historical and social-scientific criticisms just mentioned. Because the 
explanatory critique presents another version of the same underlying 
dilemma with which pragmatism was conceived to deal—trying to square 
fact and value—it should come as no surprise that each response makes use 
of familiar pragmatist strategies. I call them the instrumentalist, quietist, and 
holist versions of pragmatism.  
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A. The Instrumentalist  
I call the first version instrumentalist because that term is already used 
to describe it in the philosophical literature on practical reasoning.99 The 
instrumentalist takes what I have called the “narrow” interpretation of the 
sort of experience that can validate beliefs, limiting it to sensory experience. 
Under this model, ends and means are to be treated separately because 
whereas beliefs about means are verifiable by experience, ends are “desires” 
incapable of such verification.100 Thus, once an individual sets an end, she 
may then reason about how best to achieve that end. But one can neither 
derive nor discover the ends themselves. This is more or less the same model 
of reasoning as the one we saw in Cook. If we want to go further back, we 
could probably find something similar in Holmes, perhaps the most famous 
legal pragmatist of all.101 In any case, today instrumentalism remains the 
standard model of reasoning assumed in many of the social sciences.102 
The instrumentalist response to the explanatory critique is to embrace it. 
Indeed, as already stated, the critique was in part launched by economists, 
who thought that the legal-process effort to ascribe general social purposes 
to legal institutions failed precisely because it did not offer a sufficiently 
realistic account of how human beings reason about what to do.103 
Individuals typically have very concrete goals, and they try to maximize 
their chances of achieving them.  
The best known modern-day exponent of judicial instrumentalism is 
Judge Posner, though I quickly want to qualify that claim. Judge Posner has 
written much on the subject of legal pragmatism, and, in my view, not all of 
it fits instrumentalism.104 But I am more interested in distinguishing among 
ideal types, and Judge Posner has at least in some places given a clear 
articulation of the instrumentalist view. He has stressed, for instance, the 
relative futility of reasoning about “ends” as compared to means.105 
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According to Judge Posner, knowledge is a “tool for coping,” which means 
the questions for which humans are best suited are ones that assume some 
antecedent goal.106 But disputes over what the proper goals are, or what the 
most important values are, cannot be rationally adjudicated. Instead, “the 
sort of reasoning that moves the ball down the field, is deliberation over 
means.”107 Under this view, the only basis for criticizing moral principles 
rationally is by showing that they are ineffective tools for accomplishing 
certain social goals.108  
Posner also grounds his instrumentalism on the same sorts of 
considerations that motivate the explanatory critique. He embraces a 
naturalistic, Darwinian picture of the world, in which human nature is the 
product of homo sapiens’ success in the process of natural selection.109 From 
that fact we can infer some further facts about the kind of reasoning of which 
humans are capable. It suggests, for instance, that our “intellectual 
capabilities [are] oriented toward manipulating our local physical and social 
environment.”110 It is for that reason that “we cannot be optimistic about our 
ability to discover metaphysical entities, if there are any (which we cannot 
know), whether through philosophy or any other mode of inquiry.”111 
For similar reasons, Posner puts as little stock in moral reasoning as he 
does in metaphysical theorizing, particularly in the context of adjudication. 
His sort of pragmatist judge is primarily concerned with achieving a 
reasonable result in the particular context in which the case arises and has 
little faith in the power of general principles, such as “fairness, justice, 
autonomy, and equality” to offer helpful guidance in doing so. Posner 
makes the point colorfully: 
Pragmatists think that if the constitutional issue is, say, whether the 
children of nonnaturalized immigrants should be entitled to a free 
public education, or whether per-pupil expenditures on public school 
education should be equalized across school districts, or whether 
prayer should be allowed in public schools, the constitutional lawyer 
should study education, immigration, public finance, and religion 
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rather than inhale the intoxicating vapors of constitutional theory the 
better to manipulate empty slogans (such as “the wall of separation 
[between church and state]” and question-begging vacuities (such as 
“equality” and “fundamental rights”). What sensible person would be 
guided in such difficult, contentious and fact-laden matters by a 
philosopher or his law-professor knock-off?112 
Instead, Posner encourages judges to make decisions at a relatively low 
level of generality, with an eye towards their likely consequences. For that 
reason, social sciences that aid in predicting those consequences offer far 
more useful resources with respect to both general theory and empirical 
information than does normative theorizing.113 At the same time, Posner 
also thinks history offers a useful way to expose the irrationality of certain 
legal doctrines or practices—again, just as the critical legal historians did 
against legal practice in general.114  
A. The Quietist 
The quietist takes what I have called the “wide” view of experience, 
mentioned above, allowing one’s emotional reactions or moral intuitions to 
contribute to the justification of a set of moral and legal commitments. But 
the quietist does not rely on that wide conception of experience to challenge 
the instrumentalist’s naturalistic ontology in which man’s moral and 
cognitive capacities are understood to be the product of natural selection. 
For the same reason, the quietist does not feel compelled to deny the 
explanatory critique of the legal process assumptions. Instead, the quietist 
simply treats such explanatory claims—whether metaphysical or causal—
as irrelevant to practical questions of the sort judges face.115 Such claims are 
reinterpreted as normative ones about what to do.  
One can trace the origins of the quietest response back to at least Lon 
Fuller and Henry Hart. Fuller, for instance, repeatedly emphasized that the 
proper test of adequacy for a theory of law lay in the consequences it would 
have for those who rely on or invoke it.116 In his contribution to the so-called 
Hart-Fuller debate, he praised Hart for acknowledging that “definitions of 
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‘what law really is’ are not mere images of some datum of experience, but 
direction posts for the application of human energies.”117 In a similar vein, 
Henry Hart criticized Holmes’s heuristic of the “bad man,” by asking, “Why 
that helps, unless to make us more effective counsellors [sic] of evil, I have 
never understood. . . . Is a lawyer serving either his client or his profession 
well if he predicates his advice simply on the likelihood of the client's being 
caught, and on what would happen if he were?”118  
Fuller referred to his own conception of jurisprudence as “pragmatic,” 
and with good reason. It seems to make good, for instance, on James’s hope 
that theories become “instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can 
rest,” so that we may “move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over 
again by their aid.”119 It tests the adequacy of a theory by reference to its 
effect on practice and action. And it was on the basis of such a conception 
of theory that both he and Hart developed the purposivist interpretation of 
legal institutions so emblematic of The Legal Process teaching materials—
one they each defended as an explicit response to legal-realist assumptions 
about human behavior.120  
Today, the most articulate modern-day quietist is the late Ronald 
Dworkin.121 Interestingly, Dworkin sought to disassociate himself from the 
“instrumentalist” view of law he found in Hart and Sacks, and he labeled 
one of his chief jurisprudential targets “pragmatism.”122 But it is not hard to 
see how his “interpretive” methodological approach is a close cousin of the 
Fullerian one just described. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argued that judges 
engage in acts of “constructive interpretation,” in which they impose order 
on legal materials relevant to the case at hand in order to make the best 
moral sense of them.123 And the legal philosopher does the same thing with 
legal practice overall, interpreting it in the way that puts it in the best light 
in order that the practice may be improved as a result.124  
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119.  JAMES, supra note 13, at 53. This is not to suggest that James was a quietist. He quite clearly 
was not because he did develop metaphysical theories. See HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN 
QUESTION 22 (1995) (referring to James’s “undeniable metaphysical bent”). But the focus on the 
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120.  HART & SACKS, supra note 73, at 108; FULLER, supra note 116.  
121.  I am not the first to use this label to describe Dworkin. See, e.g., Tristram McPherson, 
Against Quietist Normative Realism, 154 PHIL. STUD. 223, 224 n.3 (2011).  
122.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 6–7 (1977) (instrumentalism); RONALD 
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As other scholars have observed, Dworkin’s substantive theory of law—
his own “constructive interpretation” of legal practice—also bears the 
marks of legal process theory.125 In his early work, he invoked the same 
distinction between “principles” and “policies” that Hart and Sacks did. And 
later he offered an understanding of law, which he dubbed “law as 
integrity,” that calls for the same sort of purposive, principled approach to 
judicial decisionmaking that Hart and Sacks called “reasoned 
elaboration.”126 Both envision the judge’s task as one of drawing deductive 
inferences from general principles derived from the underlying purposes of 
social practices.  
The conventional wisdom is that Dworkin extended and deepened the 
Hart and Sacks analysis by giving it a more “substantive,” moral foundation. 
Judges, in his view, properly base their decisions on substantive moral 
principles, such as equality and liberty. They need not be cashed out in 
“procedural” terms that purport to be “neutral” as between competing moral 
visions or political ideologies.127  
There is some truth in this view, but it is worth recognizing that Dworkin 
only secured the thicker moral account by refusing to make any ontological 
claims about the nature of man or society. This is where his quietism kicks 
in. Dworkin’s response to skeptical attacks on the sort of reasoning he 
ascribes to judges—whether skepticism of the meta-ethical sort that denies 
the reality of “moral facts” or of the critical-historical variety that purport 
to show how legal doctrines have developed to serve the interests of the 
powerful—is to assert their normative impotence. With respect to the meta-
ethical critique, Dworkin denies that such “external skepticism” can 
constitute an intelligible attack on substantive moral positions.128 And with 
respect to the historical critiques, he insists that they are arguments of the 
wrong form, because they are insufficiently practical in orientation. They 
purport to explain the legal materials when what the judge facing a decision 
seeks is guidance in the form of a justification for a decision one way or the 
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other drawn from those materials.129 Dworkin went even further in Justice 
for Hedgehogs, arguing that the entire domain of value is “independent” 
from that of facts.130  
Such observations do not imply criticism. In some ways, they only 
further burnish Dworkin’s pragmatist credentials. Indeed, for Richard 
Rorty—himself someone with quietist inclinations—Dworkin’s rejection of 
the demand for “objectivity” is precisely what warrants including him 
within the pragmatist fold.131  
But it does illustrate well how Dworkin’s account of legal practice differs 
from that of Fuller and Hart. In order to justify assigning to judges the task 
of applying principles and interpreting statutes purposively, Fuller and Hart 
felt compelled to give an account of human nature and of society that 
rejected the view they saw implicit in legal-realist critiques. They sought to 
ground liberal and democratic institutions on the basis of some “basic facts 
of human existence”—in particular, on the common interest that people 
have in maintaining the institutions holding society together, even as it 
changes and evolves to meet new demands (the other meaning of process in 
“legal process”).132 Now Fuller and Hart may not have been successful in 
generating values from the ground up, on the basis of such “basic facts,” 
and they may have taken for granted the level of political consensus that 
existed in the United States during the postwar period in which they wrote. 
But they at least recognized the gap between fact and value as a problem, 
even if one they ultimately failed to solve.133  
Dworkin the quietist, on the other hand, denies that there is any such 
problem. Instead, he ultimately describes efforts to “‘reconcile’ the moral 
and the natural worlds” or “to align the ‘practical’ perspective we take when 
living our lives with the ‘theoretical’ perspective from which we study 
ourselves as part of nature” as “entirely bogus philosophical projects.”134 
																																								 																				
129.  DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122, at 13, 273 (arguing that such critical histories, “describe 
law genetically,” and in so doing, “may reflect a serious misunderstanding of the kind of argument 
necessary to establish a skeptical position: the argument must be interpretive rather than historical.”).  
130.  DWORKIN, HEDGEHOGS, supra note 128, at 17.  
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B. The Holist  
The holist, like the quietist, takes the “wide” view of experience. For that 
reason, also like the quietist, she believes that our moral experience can 
serve as a genuine guide for practical decisionmaking. But unlike the 
quietist, she does not dismiss possible metaphysical or causal explanations 
as irrelevant to practical reasoning. Instead, she considers such explanations 
as potentially relevant to moral justification and, more controversially, vice 
versa. Her reasoning is holistic because it sees factual and evaluative 
considerations as interdependent.135 
Like the quietist, one can find roots of holism in Hart and Fuller. Indeed, 
their talk of the “interaction of means and ends,” already mentioned, 
reflected such holistic inclinations.136 The idea was that we could rationally 
reevaluate our values or ends in light of the means required to achieve them, 
either because the means are too burdensome or, more interestingly, because 
the means indicate a new, previously unseen or unappreciated value worth 
pursuing. In analyzing the nature of adjudication, for instance, Fuller 
reflected on the fact that two facts both seemed to be true: (1) In order for 
adjudication to be rational, there must be some standard that the adjudicator 
applies to the facts of the case in determining a party’s responsibility or the 
validity of her claim (value premise) but that (2) parties seemed to accept 
the results of adjudications even when there was no clearly established rule 
(fact premise) available to serve as the standard.137 From these premises, 
Fuller inferred that courts could rationally decide cases according to 
principles derived from the underlying purposes of a community even when 
those principles themselves were not known or recognized by all of those 
within that community.138  
Now of course this reasoning depends on some additional premises, 
namely (3) that what explains the parties’ acceptance of the verdicts of 
adjudication is their belief in the rationality of the process and (4) that such 
a belief is in fact warranted. Fuller recognized these premises and 
acknowledged that they might be false.139 But the point is that he continually 
looked for ways to make sense of both his (moral) intuitions about what 
constitutes fair procedures and legitimate legal institutions and his 
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(descriptive) explanations of how those procedures and institutions actually 
function. 
In my view, a modern-day representative of the holistic strand of 
pragmatism is former Justice David Souter. I will not offer a full defense of 
that characterization, because I have done that elsewhere.140 But the basic 
claim is that Justice Souter sees history as relevant to judicial reasoning in 
a way that only makes sense under a holistic approach. In particular, as a 
Justice, he sometimes looked to historical circumstances to either buttress 
or undermine the legal reasoning of a past decision. 
Compare, for instance, Justice Souter’s dissent in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida141 and the stare decisis analysis in the joint opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.142 In his Seminole Tribe 
dissent, Souter argued that the Court should not treat Hans v. Louisiana, an 
1896 case in which the Court held that Louisiana was immune from suit 
brought by one of its bondholders, as an authoritative precedent because that 
decision was best explained as the result of the Court’s concern with its own 
institutional power.143 Conversely, in Casey, the joint opinion, in deciding 
to uphold Roe v. Wade, distinguished Roe from Lochner v. New York and 
Plessy v. Ferguson on the ground that in the years between those cases and 
the decisions that overruled them there had been a “change in the facts” or 
the “perception of facts” such that the earlier cases rightly came to be seen 
as wrongly decided. Even if separate-but-equal seemed tolerable in 1896, 
for instance, by 1954 it had become clear that it was inconsistent with 
equality under the law, thus warranting a principled reversal of doctrine. But 
no such comparable change in facts had occurred in the years since Roe. 
Therefore, according to Souter, the decision should stand.144 
Judges rarely invoke social, political, or other “external” historical 
explanations of past cases in the way that Souter did in these cases.145 
Whether that is a cause for regret or rejoicing is not my concern. The point 
is instead to show that its use implies a holism about facts and values, about 
history and political philosophy, and that it does so in a way which points 
to a third, distinct response to the explanatory critique.  
Recall that the instrumentalist accepts the explanatory critique and 
endorses the skepticism about social purposes and moral principles it seems 
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to imply, whereas the quietist treats the explanatory critique as normatively 
inert, and then goes on to assert moral principles as part of something like 
Dworkin’s “constructive interpretation.” The holist, though, treats both 
normative and historical or explanatory argument as relevant to the ultimate 
practical assessment of a legal doctrine or regime.146 Therefore, her response 
is to acknowledge the force of the explanatory critique but remain alive to 
the possibility that, on the particular facts of a given case, the more benign 
story of social purposes and moral principles may offer a better overall 
explanation of the practice. It seeks an account, in other words, that 
reconciles factual beliefs and normative judgments.147 
 I recognize that I have not described precisely how the holistic style of 
reasoning proceeds. Above I criticized Cardozo for his ambiguous 
characterizations of the judicial process, and yet I have not offered anything 
better on behalf of the holistic view. Its only offsetting virtue may be that it 
expresses in somewhat stark terms an “antinomy” of the sort Cardozo 
himself thought pervaded the common law.148 In this case, it is the antinomy 
between the demands of practical justification and that of theoretical 
explanation—precisely the tension Dworkin dismisses as “bogus.”  
For the same reason, the holist also has a plausible claim to being an heir 
to the pragmatist tradition.149 In a sense, she takes even more seriously than 
do the other two sorts of pragmatist the difficulty posed by James’ original 
dilemma—between empiricism and rationalism, optimism and pessimism, 
idealism and materialism, “free-willism” and determinism.150 The 
instrumentalist adopts a naturalistic ontology as both the product of, and 
justification for, her privileging of sensory experience over what we have 
called emotional or “lived” experience. The quietist adopts a practical 
stance (that nominally accepts a naturalistic ontology but treats it as 
irrelevant to moral inquiry) as both the product of, and justification for, 
according weight to lived experience—requiring only that it cohere with her 
other moral commitments.  
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The holist, meanwhile, takes the wide view of experience, recognizes the 
tension between the practical and theoretical stances she might adopt 
towards that experience, and does not rule out in advance which one will 
triumph when it comes to making any particular practical decision. It is a 
pragmatism that “devoted though she be to facts,” as James put it, “has no 
such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under” and so “has no 
objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about 
among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you somewhere.”151 
Even if the holist is never able to “solve” that dilemma, she may be more 
willing than the others to do as Lon Fuller suggested and “accept frankly a 
state of unresolved conflict or tension in our reasoning.”152 
CONCLUSION: PRAGMATISM AND LAW 
The purpose of this essay has been mainly descriptive. I have sought to 
show both that some views (like those of Hart and Sacks and Dworkin) not 
typically dubbed “pragmatist” can plausibly be seen as part of the 
pragmatist tradition and that other views that are often lumped together 
under that label encourage different sorts of practical reasoning. I have 
supported this thesis by showing how each view responds to difficulties 
raised and articulated by earlier jurists and legal theorists. Each of the three 
forms of pragmatism discussed above rejects legal formalism, and all see 
judicial reasoning as in some way purposive or “instrumental,” broadly 
conceived. But they differ in ways that are not merely political, as Rorty 
alleged. They differ with respect to how judges should properly reason 
about facts and values.  
Let me conclude by responding to a methodological objection, which 
will allow me to make one last, admittedly speculative suggestion. One 
might object that the interpretive approach taken in this paper 
simultaneously manages to produce bad history and bad philosophy. It is 
bad history because not only have I ignored all of the existing historical 
literature on the figures I discuss, my own account is threadbare. It focuses 
only on a handful of legal thinkers, ignores their intellectual influences, 
strips them out of their social and political context, and in general treats 
them anachronistically. It is Whiggish, law-office history of the worst sort.  
It is bad philosophy because not only have I ignored all of the existing 
philosophical literature on the many and deep metaphysical, 
epistemological and jurisprudential issues, my own discussion of them is 
crude and superficial. I have ignored crucial distinctions and failed to define 
terms with the sort of precision necessary to move the philosophical debates 
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forward. It is the work product of, to steal Judge Posner’s line, a “law 
professor knock-off” of a real philosopher.153 
To some extent, I plead guilty as charged. The objection on both fronts 
has some truth to it. But there is also an ulterior motive at work, which in 
part explains the approach taken. Although I have framed each form of 
pragmatism as one that implies a particular model of practical reasoning for 
the judge, it is not hard to see that each also roughly correlates to the sort of 
theoretical reasoning employed by different sorts of legal scholars. The 
instrumentalist describes the method of legal economists and political 
scientists (at least those of a certain, rational-choice stripe). The quietist 
adopts a method not unlike moral philosophers who ignore meta-ethical 
questions as well as doctrinalists who defend their scholarly endeavors as 
taking an “internal” point of view of legal practice. And the holist’s 
approach may underwrite the methods of various historians, sociologists, 
and “law and humanities” scholars—at least those who seek to extract some 
sort of normative implication from their studies.  
That an account of practical reasoning could also serve as a model of 
theoretical reasoning is not particularly surprising because arguably one of 
the central lessons of pragmatism is that the two cannot be cleanly 
separated.154 But I omitted mention of any of those disciplinary influences 
not because they have not had an impact on legal thinking; surely they have. 
The reason, rather, was to avoid a certain picture of legal theory today, 
which I believe is both deeply entrenched and distorting.155 That picture 
portrays law as a social practice that has its own distinctive “internal” 
sources, methods and values but which must constantly face threats from 
“external” disciplines, whether history, economics, psychology, philosophy 
or literary theory.156 According to this view, although law is sometimes able 
to absorb the insights of these disciplines, it only does so when it is able to 
serve its own professional and prescriptive demands.157  Efforts by judges 
or legal theorists to make use of other disciplines thus represent a sort of 
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corruption of those disciplines. Hence the historians’ frequent lament that 
law professors are doing “‘law-office history.’”158 
I have instead sought to show how the sorts of reasoning described 
above, while they may well have been developed and refined by scholars in 
other fields, nevertheless arise naturally as responses to fundamental and 
enduring philosophical problems at the heart of law and adjudication. That 
is why I have drawn on some well-known and influential works of legal 
theory from the past century or so but have not treated them the way an 
historian might, as products of particular intellectual and political contexts. 
Instead, I have consciously framed them as participants in a common 
dialogue about the same core problems raised by legal decisionmaking.  
Lest I be misunderstood, I should emphasize that my point in doing so is 
not to suggest that these methods of practical reasoning properly belong 
within the province of law, or that lawyers and legal theorists have some 
special insight or skill, justifying their dismissal of insights and criticisms 
offered by those with backgrounds in other disciplines. It is only to suggest 
that the law’s tendency to place prescriptive demands on intellectual 
contributions from any quarter may be—to use a trendy phrase—a feature, 
not a bug. And by that I mean an intellectual feature. That is because it is 
not just the law that is in the business of constantly trying to reconcile 
theoretical and practical demands; so, too, is every scholar and every human 
being. 
Which brings us back to William James and pragmatism. Although I 
framed this essay as one in which James’s philosophical speculations 
influenced subsequent legal thinkers, it is worth remembering that the 
disciplinary influence also ran the other way. It may not have been an 
accident that four of the eight members of the “Metaphysical Club” in which 
pragmatism was born were lawyers;159 or that Charles Peirce considered one 
of them, Nicholas St. John Green, to be “the grandfather of pragmatism.”160 
And it may not be merely coincidental that James used the figure of the 
common law judge to illustrate his pragmatist conception of truth.161 If not, 
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then the common law tradition may have yielded not just a distinctive, third 
philosophy of law, but a family of related views about how to acquire 
knowledge about the world for use within it.162  
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